A Syria Operation: What Would Be the Consequences of a New Offensive?

What would be the consequences of a possible Syria operation by Turkey?

Could Turkey carry out a new military operation on Syrian territory in the coming days despite warnings from domestic and international public opinion? We assessed its effects on domestic and foreign policy and the reactions that might come from the states with a say in the region.

Ali Çağlar:

The number of ISIS militants in the desert region along the Syria–Iraq border is estimated at between 7,000 and 10,000. In addition, there are around 70,000 armed militants in Idlib belonging to many large and small jihadist groups. Another area where ISIS is strong is Hasakah and the surrounding towns under Kurdish control.

Seven prisons in the Kurdish-controlled areas hold about 12,000 ISIS militants from 54 countries or nationalities. In addition, more than one hundred thousand people live in 14 camps, 3 of them large, where the families of ISIS members are gathered (about 56,000 in al-Hol, the largest). Most recently in January, in a large-scale ISIS attack aimed at freeing jihadist militants from the Sina’a prison near Hasakah, ISIS and the SDF fought for a week in and around the prison. It was claimed that hundreds of prisoners escaped during the attack.

There is no doubt that the Syria operation Turkey has announced it will launch “to create safe zones 30 kilometres deep along its southern border” will open space for the weakened Salafi-jihadist organisations that have gone underground. Looking at the events of the past year, many developments can be seen that bear out this view. Dozens of questions, from the legal status of the safe zones the operation aims at to how their security will be ensured, remain unanswered.

An unfounded operation driven entirely by domestic politics and lacking international support cannot achieve its military and political goals. Dozens of Salafi groups, above all ISIS, which would take advantage of the resulting chaos and conflict, have the potential to reignite the civil war. The price of a new civil war would be much heavier. With new migrants arriving at our border, the cost of war loaded onto a people already crushed by a severe economic crisis, and the possibility of conflict and instability spilling over into our country, I believe Turkey would pay the heaviest share of that price.

Salih Durmuş:

A possible Syria operation, which Turkey has frequently raised in recent days, will naturally have certain effects on domestic and foreign policy. In that case it would become the main item on the domestic agenda, and all the other issues the government does not want discussed would fade into the background.

It is true that problems such as the economic crisis, the pandemic, conflicts between deep-state structures, corruption and the uncontrolled refugee issue cause the government a degree of trouble. But although domestic propaganda says “foreign powers are to blame for every problem; they are against the government and Erdoğan”, it is clear that things are not at all as they seem.

It is a fact that he has the full support of this power centre, which Erdoğan in his own words calls the “command and control centre”. In this context, a certain amount of indulgence in the private and political life of the supported head of state is tolerated. Otherwise we see a swift reaction begin in line with a pre-planned scenario; Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath, for example. However, if Western states, above all the US, do not attach particular importance to the issue, a possible Syria operation will be brushed off with messages of condemnation alone.

In conclusion, the points that should be kept in mind when interpreting developments are these:

1. Erdoğan sees himself, or wants to present himself, in a special position such as caliph or Mahdi, and for this reason his interest in Syria will never diminish.
2. Even a regional incident such as the recent bombing in Zakho has the potential to trigger very major developments in the region.
3. On the GMEI (Greater Middle East Initiative) map leaked to the press, Turkey appears among the countries that will lose territory in the future.

Sezai Akyüz:

First of all, looking at the countries with a say in the conflict zones in Syria, the US, Russia and Iran can be counted as the influential actors. These countries’ habit of pointing at every opportunity to the weak spots of Erdoğan and the AKP, and of quietly brandishing a stick over 15 July, ISIS and corruption, is enough to block the implementation of policies in Turkey’s favour in the region.

In today’s conjuncture, because of the weaknesses of the politicians governing the country, it does not seem possible for Turkey to carry out an operation without the knowledge and permission of the powerful actors in the region, let alone to launch an offensive they do not approve of. As will be remembered from the recent operations, while Turkey bore the casualties and the security burden in the region, the gains and political successes went to the US and Russia. In Syria, one of the areas where the US and Russia run a win-win relationship, they support organisations on the one hand while on the other allowing operations that will increase support for the AKP among the Turkish public.

I suppose this is the path they consider least harmful to the balances in the region. After all, as long as the funeral halva is not cooked in their own homes, it will not taste bitter to them.