Turkey–Israel Relations: Does the Rapprochement Serve Turkey’s Interests?

What does Turkey expect from improving its relations with Israel? How does the rapprochement fit with Turkey’s interests in the region?

In light of recent developments, our authors assessed the reasons behind, and the likely consequences of, the relations Turkey is trying to rebuild with Israel.

Abdullah Bağcı:

Setting elaborate conspiracy theories aside, we see that historically two issues have stood at the heart of Turkey–Israel relations: (1) the economy and (2) Palestine.

Considering that trade between Turkey and Israel grew more than sixfold between 2002, when the AKP came to power, and 2022, it is clear that there has in fact been little real estrangement in this area. The troublesome issue under the economic heading is the sharing of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. As is well known, Turkey’s absence from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), in which Israel is a leading actor and which includes Greece, Egypt, the Greek Cypriot administration and even Palestine, meant that Ankara was being denied a slice of this pie. However, because of the high cost of carrying the gas to the European market via the Greek Cypriot side, and because Israel did not receive the support it expected from the United States, the route inevitably turned back towards Turkey.

The Mavi Marmara incident of 2010, carried out to strengthen Erdoğan’s base in domestic politics and in which our citizens lost their lives, the process of putting Israel in its place (!) that followed, then the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital in 2017 and the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors in May 2018: all of these served the AKP’s agenda right on time, and today they have dropped off the agenda of the party base as well.

Although Herzog, referring to Palestine, said: “We must agree in advance that we will not agree on everything”, Erdoğan’s reassurance after inviting Abbas a week after his phone call with Herzog, “our support for the Palestinian cause will continue, and this rapprochement will in fact benefit it too”, together with Çavuşoğlu’s statement that “Fatah and Hamas also support normalisation”, seems to have been enough for the AKP base. The opposition, too, welcomes the policy of reconciliation in foreign relations. In short, this rapprochement will not harm Erdoğan in domestic politics or cost him points with his base.

Mehmet Kılıçparlar:

In international relations, tension or rapprochement between two countries normally has a direct effect on the trade between them. In other words, countries aim to raise their trade as they improve relations. An approach of “first we increase our trade volume, then we grow closer” is not the normal way of things. When there is tension, trade falls; with improvement, it rises.

Trade between Turkey and Israel, however, has continued to grow over the past 20 years, despite year-to-year fluctuations, including the periods when President Erdoğan declared Israel a “terror state”.

So while Erdoğan left no insult unsaid against Israel in public, behind the scenes he made sure that commercial relations were conducted at the highest level. Especially in the past 10 years, Erdoğan has set the level of Turkey’s relations with foreign countries by putting his own interests and those of his circle ahead of national interests (Qatar, Russia, the UAE and so on).

From this point, with trade between Turkey and Israel already rising every year, we can say that “what Erdoğan expects from this rapprochement is not the national interest”. Just as Qatar has bought a significant amount of land and businesses in Turkey, it is highly likely that Israel will make similar purchases in Turkey in the period ahead.

Ali Kerem Sezgin:

Apart from the military and economic rapprochement of the 1990s, Turkey–Israel relations were never particularly good, but they had never seen ruptures as great as under the AKP government. We can say that the developments following Erdoğan’s “one minute” outburst at the Davos summit in 2009 marked a turning point in relations between the two countries.

Today the AKP government has once again been forced to change its Israel policy. With the elections approaching and in a rush to find a way out for his ailing economy, Erdoğan is seeking investment, particularly from Israel-based investors. We have recently seen similar tactics in relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. For this purpose Erdoğan appears ready, in the short term, to take any step back and abandon the policies he has pursued.

Another reason for the policy change is the effort, so as not to fall further behind in the air-power rivalry with Greece, to win the support of pro-Israel lobby groups against the Greek lobby, particularly in the US Congress.

In conclusion, both countries are taking steps to improve relations. For Israel, the most suitable route for marketing its natural gas to Europe passes through Turkey. Erdoğan, for his part, believes that with the support of pro-Israel lobby groups he can ease his position in the economy and foreign policy for a while longer. (Update note, November 2026: Relations broke down again with the attack of 7 October 2023 and the Gaza war that followed; in May 2024 Turkey halted all direct trade with Israel, although Israeli data indicate that some Turkish goods continued to reach Israel via third countries.)