Turkey–Syria Relations: What Could Be the Consequences of a Policy Change?

What could be the consequences of Turkey changing the Syria policy it has pursued so far?

In light of recent developments, our authors assessed the likely consequences of the relations Turkey is striving to develop with Syria.

Sezai Akyüz:

The issue of opposition groups in Syria will remain a threat to both our country and the world in the years ahead, as it has been over the past 10 years. Countries seeking to steer the Syrian government lost control, over time, of many of the groups they financed and equipped. Both this loss of control and the fact that the war never ended as intended led to problems between the opposition and the countries supporting it. Because Assad re-established control in many areas, Turkey had to admit into the country many members of organisations it had previously supported, equipped and financed.

These structures, heavily criminalised over time, tend to use their armed force at any moment, regardless of the conditions around them. It is also well known that Turkey has drawn the anger both of the opposition groups it openly opposes in the region and of the pro-regime groups. Ultimately, if you meddle in the internal affairs of a country with which you share a 900 km border, sometimes even by supporting terrorist groups, it is inevitable that both the fire there and the tongs you hold will hurt you.

In possible peace talks with Syria, the Assad side’s first demand will be that the opposition be handed over or put on trial. If Turkey accepts these demands, the gun barrels of the groups it once supported will inevitably turn on our country.

H. Murat Kadir:

Erdoğan knows very well that the policy he has followed in Syria for years has been wrong and unsuccessful. I think the policy change now on the agenda is partly aimed at narrowing the opposition’s room for rhetoric ahead of the elections. Recently the opposition has run a campaign that resonates directly with voters, built on Erdoğan’s failed Syria policy and on sending back the Syrian refugees, whose number approaches 4 million. Erdoğan is aware of this and, despite the very great risks, partly out of desperation, has begun taking steps to take this trump card away from the opposition.

According to recent polls, the Victory Party is expected to win around 2 to 2.5 per cent of the vote on the promise of sending refugees back alone. The CHP has a similar promise, and the issue can be said to carry a vote potential of at least around 5 to 6 per cent. By opening the door to diplomacy with the Syrian government, somehow bringing to the table an agreement on sending refugees back, even a long-term one, and perhaps sending a small number of Syrians back before the elections, Erdoğan aims to win back votes likely to go to the opposition.

As a first concrete step in this direction, Doğu Perinçek, the government’s covert partner, will go to Damascus in September. Although he is not an official representative of the Republic of Turkey, Perinçek will unofficially be at the table on Erdoğan’s behalf. We can expect the meeting to stress that Turkey supports Syria’s territorial integrity, and to discuss issues such as the need for the Syrian state to take the initiative in fighting terrorist organisations like the PKK, PYD and YPG in northern Syria, and finally a roadmap for the return of Syrian refugees. (Update note, November 2026: The planned visit was postponed by the Syrian side and was put off repeatedly in the months that followed.)

In the long run, this change in Syria policy can also be seen as the prelude to a process ending in Turkey’s withdrawal from Syria. I do not think Erdoğan, who in the past showed masterful skill in presenting the Syria operations to the public, will have trouble getting the public to accept a withdrawal that leaves behind hundreds of fallen soldiers and so many national resources spent.

Once the door to diplomacy in Syria is left open, I think Erdoğan, who will “hand over” the fight against terrorism there to his future “brother” Assad, will focus on Kurdish votes, which hold the most pivotal position in the coming elections. In this context, I believe it will come as no surprise if Erdoğan soon takes steps aimed at significant changes in the voting behaviour of Kurdish voters.

Bayram Bayır:

It is clear that the “open door policy” Turkey has applied to Syrian refugees since 2011 has recently entered a process of change. Until now the issue has been handled with a chaotic style of governance. Syrian refugees have been used as political material, sometimes as a bargaining chip against Europe and sometimes to produce ummah-oriented policies.

With the complete absence of an integration process and the effect of the economic crisis, chauvinist opposition figures have turned society’s attitude towards Syrian refugees against the AKP. Hoping to escape this negative process, the AKP regime is trying to develop a policy under the name of “voluntary return”.

Even if an agreement is reached with the Assad regime, Syrian refugees appear far from eager to return to their country. More than 3.5 million Syrians live in Turkey under registration, and the number is estimated to be higher when unregistered people are included. Trying to wind down the presence of such a large population at once through a policy change will cause very serious humanitarian crises and turmoil. The only result the AKP government’s incompetent management so far will produce here is disaster. (Update note, November 2026: Returns accelerated after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. According to UNHCR data, the number of registered Syrians in Turkey had fallen to about 2.2 million by autumn 2026.)

The lack of a clear policy towards Syrians is causing racist rhetoric to grow by the day. In the event of political turmoil, hard days await Syrian refugees. Serious injustices on a ground without social peace will inevitably affect the whole country deeply. (Update note, November 2026: The Assad regime fell in December 2024. From then on, Turkey’s Syria policy and the question of refugee return moved onto entirely new ground.)