Is Jihadism Part of Political Islam?

The claim that jihadist organisations have been “finished” or dismantled is highly misleading. This claim becomes meaningless in the face of the structural transformations and organisational permeability of jihadist organisations.

Structurally dismantling a jihadist organisation and neutralising its manpower is not possible as long as other jihadist organisations exist. In terms of security policy, or politically, it may perhaps be considered reasonable to say that a jihadist organisation’s existence has been ended. It may also be possible to explain this using the classic data of organisational sociology. But the permeability of members and the ideological continuity (or transmission) in such organisations reduce the claim that one of them has been dismantled to the level of an assertion. And this assertion loses its validity in a very short time.

In this context, the effort to combat jihadist organisations such as ISIS, al-Nusra, the Taliban and al-Qaeda must be directed not at organisations one by one but at combating jihadist terror as a whole.

Let me try to explain why I think so.

A society or communities formed on the basis of religion or ideology must first be examined through their own systematics and their own concepts. As a result of this examination, it is a reasonable approach to scrutinise the consistency and usefulness of their own (religious or ideological) data, or whichever aspect is to be assessed by whichever criterion. However, the reflection of religion or ideology in daily life and its effect on our belief in the hereafter require entirely different examinations.

Using religious terminology within the political sphere, or, specifically in the case of Islam, developing political discourse with the data of Islam, results in religion being used as a political tool. This is roughly the visible form of political Islam in our everyday practice. Of course, political Islam is not limited to this. At this point it is perfectly possible to speak of the politicisation of Islam, but it is not right to build an idea- or action-based conceptual framework using the term Political Islam.

When you attempt this, you activate, that is, turn into a front, the discourse of “Political Islam”. And the name for this is “jihadism”. At this point, the motivation that politicians and militants have in politics and in the field of armed action is roughly the same. Both groups are fighting for the realisation of a system of government in which religious rules will prevail. If they were striving with the same religious motivation but in different lanes, it would not be right to think so. Yet for the fanatics of Political Islam, the idea of jihad is one of the methods they want to use to reach their goals.

As with all formations that do not draw their strength from the grassroots and want to shape society in a top-down manner, the practitioners of Political Islam have never given up the idea of having an armed force under their own control. Whether its name is SADAT, ISIS, the FSA or, in general terms, jihadist, it makes no difference. At this point, jihadists and the Salafi currents that feed this practice are seen not as the back garden of Political Islam but as a directly functional instrument of it.

The matter can also be looked at in this way. When we say “Political Islam”, we must also include the jihad movements that have been influential for the last half century. After all, groups that embrace the idea of jihad also have a political goal: to establish the order of sharia.

It must not be forgotten that the fight against the Taliban, ISIS or any other jihadist formation has never been on countries’ agendas in an ideological dimension.

The fact that both Political Islam and organisations such as al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban, which impose the idea of jihad as a primary way of life or form of struggle, define themselves as a product of the Sunni understanding of Islam stems entirely from the concern to find a place on ideological ground. The discourse built on this concern unfortunately leads those writing about jihadism to make faulty assessments.

The fact that both Political Islam and organisations embracing jihadism give the appearance of acting in the name of Islam, or that some people think they do, is the source of many problems. Perhaps the source of the problem should be sought in this context. That is to say:

Seeking the origins of today’s Political Islam practices in the past seems logical at first. But it is wrong, just as it is wrong to seek the origins of today’s Salafi currents in the past.

Every time we see figures parading on screens and in the marketplace with their white robes, long beards and turbaned heads, a vague image of early Islamic history coming alive in our minds leads our attention to the wrong places. These images may have an emotional resonance for those who wear them, but establishing an intellectual link with the early periods of Islamic history on the basis of this attire is an entirely wrong reading.

Seeking traces of early Islamic history in the religiously motivated currents of modern and postmodern times, whether intellectual or action-oriented, and establishing a link between them and that period, is a historicist approach built on “straight logic”.

The most important motivation of almost all the radical currents emerging today is that they are “reactive”. They are reactive against anti-religious discourse, against the art and social life shaped by modern and postmodern perception, against the liberal policies arising in areas where secular approaches are dominant, and against secular everyday experiences.

When naming religious-looking currents that emerge from a reactive motivation (for example, when we say “Salafi groups”), drawing attention to a historical continuity in order to give these currents ideological depth means nothing more than advertising them.

Almost all these currents are products of the times we are living through. Today, can one speak of an intellectual, political, social or bureaucratic movement that does not put what is popular at the centre of its life? Almost every structure and action is wrapped in the allure of the popular. While every group claims to display an ideal stance and action, time will of course show how much of this is sincere and directed at the public good.

The bottom line is this: whether within the discipline of political science or from the standpoint of divinity and theological approaches, establishing a link with early Islamic history when examining the emergence of jihad movements will make all analyses and assessments based on it faulty. Those who defend jihad movements have no historical approach to offer on their necessity either. Indeed, according to experts in Islamic history and Islamic jurisprudence, it is not possible to find, either in the Qur’an, in the sayings of the Prophet of Islam or in the approaches of the leading imams of the schools of law, a perspective that prioritises the idea of jihad in the sense the jihadists understand it.

Everyone has the right to object to today’s current issues. But presenting this objection as a reactive, Islam-referenced (political or jihadist) movement to gather followers is frankly nothing but deceiving people with religion. At this point, what could be more natural than the Political Islamists seeing the jihadists as brothers and giving them every kind of support!

Let us give a clear answer to the question in the title: Yes, jihadism is part of Political Islam. And this alliance is a threat to Türkiye, to the world and to Islam.