According to James Finckenauer, professor at Rutgers University, the glamorization of the mobsters started when they stood up to prohibition. Their rebellious, unruly and impudent attitudes are enough to win the support of the masses. Their impervious stance to the political whims of the establishment has been the only ray of hope for society who were ruled with an iron fist.
Mario Puzo, screenwriter of “The Godfather”, claims that mobsters always cared about their family, friends, associates and men. This allowed them to be seen as “godfather or father” in the eyes of society. The belief of “Sure, he will take care of my family” has become a motivation that has many buyers, especially in Turkish society.
New York University psychologist Yaacov Trope coined a term psychological distance to describe a coping mechanism with depression with life’s troubles, even with people we hate. The fact that the mafia harms the untouchable, gives a deep gloat to the spectators. Knowing that the war is so far away from them exhilarates pleasure.
Another captivating feature is “they have own codes of conduct and methods”. For example, a string of beads, rings, vests, traditional egg-heel shoes, aphorisms and many others became a part of everyday life.
“Otherness” is another reason why people admire the mobsters. Italians and Italian-Americans, for example, were often considered “other” by much of the rest in USA and this exclusion made them heroes of the mournful crowds seeking justice. Social psychologists state, if people don’t have any dealings with stuff the mob deals with, they feel safe and have no worries that their lives will come into contact with mobsters’ lives. A retired teacher, who does not have any illegal activity and does not know what cocaine-marijuana is, and about extortion, is an ordinary person who watches the lives of the mafia fathers(!) like Turkish TV-series “Valley of the Wolves”.
State-Mafia Relations and Russia
Today’s mafia bosses keep up to date. Mark Galeotti, a writer on transnational crime and Russian issues, states that the criminal ‘underworld’ and the political ‘upperworld’ have intertwined which means that the mobsters also became hybrid.
Unfortunately, today’s mafia bosses rose from drug traffickers level to hybrid gangster-businessmen level. Galeotti gives the example from the governments in Russia, but it seems that the situation is similar for every nation.
The lesson learned from Yeltsin’s era in Russia is that “if the mafia-state relationship gets out of control one day, it can cause trouble for the state”. The mafia, which emerged where the state was not enough, gained immunity over time and had more say. This, of course, worried leaders who did not want to share authority.
When Putin came to power, the mafia’s control over the government was clearly broken. Putin was serious in his tough law-and-order rhetoric, but it soon became clear that he was simply offering or imposing a new social contract with the underworld. After this point, the mafia and the government started to work more harmoniously and never separated from each other again. The mafia understood that the state was the biggest gang in town and did nothing to directly challenge it. That means, the underworld complied. Indiscriminate street violence was replaced by targeted assassinations; tattoos were out, and suits were in. There was no longer room for old-school criminals. New generation mafia bosses appeared as respected businessmen. This was not just a process of setting new boundaries for the criminals; it also led to a restructuring of connections between the underworld and the ‘upperworld’, to the benefit of the latter.
The result was not simply institutionalisation of corruption and further blurring of the boundaries between licit and illicit; but the emergence of a conditional understanding that Russia now had a ‘nationalised underworld’. In short, when the state wanted something from the criminals, they were expected to comply. Russian governments’ relations with the mafia have been carried out successfully for years. Russia also used organized crime as an instrument of statecraft abroad. But nothing remained unnoticed. Just as Trump’s contact with the mafia when he was just a younger investor.
Sedat Peker
Sedat Peker (a Turkish mafia boss and whistle-blower who has made various allegations about Turkish politicians and current government) went through the same process. He worked with the Erdoğan’s government, did what he was told to do. Then something had gone wrong and he rocked the boat. First, he started by reminding the code of silence “Omertà”. What he actually did was “shakedown” in mob jargon. He blackmailed and gave his accomplices a scare. However, the dose of anger started to abate and its effect decreased over time. He poured honey in the ears of opposing sides like (Kurds, some religious communities, opposition etc.) which made thousands of people dissatisfied with the administration cling to the television.
Now, millions of followers on YouTube and Twitter are waiting for his new disclosures, as millions eagerly waiting for the new season of Netflix’s famous “La Casa de Papel” series. Because as you keep silent, there is a risk of falling off the agenda and being forgotten. Rumors of “smashed” or “agreed” also come before the questions. For example; Isn’t it possible for him to disclose the so-called 15th of July coup attempt a little more? Does he really know about only the secret distribution of weapons on the 15th of July?
So the question is: When the chronological order comes to July 15th and the hierarchical order to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is it usual for Sedat Peker to speak in the opposite direction – by minimizing the target?
And is this amount of fans enough for the nomination?
